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1. Introduction 
The demographic structures of many Western economies are experiencing substantial 
changes. Low fertility and longer expected lifetimes are behind this fundamental 
transformation. Both are presumed to have a large effect e.g. on fiscal policy. In fact, 
ageing and fertility decline are currently considered to be the main problems in 
Europe and many other industrialized economies. A report by the European 
Commission (see Oksanen 2003, p.11) goes even so far as stating that “the increase in 
public expenditure is mostly caused by declined fertility and increasing longevity…” 
Both ageing and fertility decline are taken as "facts of life", which cannot be 
affected by any policies. In other words, they are apparently considered to be 
exogenous variables. Moreover, they are usually regarded as “problems”, which to us 
sounds somewhat surprising. At least an increase in the life-span is usually thought to 
increase individual’s lifetime utility and well-being. 
The exogeneity assumption might be true more with ageing, but definitely not 
with fertility as we argue below. But how does fertility change? Obviously, any 
change requires changes in institutions and other relevant variables such as incentives 
to have children, but we simply cannot rule out all the possibilities for affecting 
fertility behavior even in the medium run. Both historical data and cross-country 
comparisons show that there are, and have been, huge differences in fertility behavior.  
Fertility issues have received quite a lot of attention in the recent empirical and 
theoretical literature dealing with the long-term problems of many economies. Much 
of this literature approaches the study of fertility with overlapping generations 
framework, which at least for a long-term perspective is quite a natural model. 
Perhaps the key theoretical issue in these models is how to solve the level of donation 
given by children to their parents. If the middle-aged person’s utility depends on his 
parents’ utility, the optimum level of donation is quite straightforward to derive.
1 This 
approach is followed by e.g. Boldrin and Jones (2002) and Boldrin, De Nardi and 
Jones (2005). Ehrlich and Lui (1991, 1998), and Ehrlich and Kim (2005) assume in 
turn that there is a social compact between children and parents in such a way that the 
level of transfers received by the old from their offspring is proportional to the 
offspring’s labor earnings. 
                                                 
1 There are though game-theoretic issues involved here. Are children e.g. operating in a cooperative or 
non-cooperative fashion, when deciding about the level of donation? More on these issues see Boldrin 
and Jones (2002). 2   
On the other hand, if the middle-aged person’s utility does not depend on his 
parents’ utility, the optimum level of donation is not so straightforward to derive. 
Cigno (1993) and Rosati (1996) follow this non-altruistic approach. Cigno does not 
execute complete formal analysis, but his discussion of the transfer problem between 
children and parents is informative and illuminating. Rosati assumes that there is 
uncertainty in the intra-family transfers, and lets the old’s utility depend on the 
variance of that uncertainty.   
Some of these papers have different emphasis from those of our paper. Here 
we briefly review their results on the effects of social security on fertility. Both Cigno 
and Rosati argue that the public pension system reduces incentives to have children. 
Rosati interestingly ties his result to the degree of risk aversion of consumers. The 
negative effect is obtained with a high degree of risk aversion. Ehrlich and Lui (1998) 
also contend that social security system diminishes fertility. The same conclusion is 
drawn by Ehrlich and Kim (2005). Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005) demonstrate 
the effect of old-age pensions in fertility in two types of calibrated models. In a model 
based on Boldrin and Jones (2002) they show that the effect is quite large, but in a 
model based on Barro and Becker (1989) it is actually very small. 
To support our empirical work we construct a simple exchange economy two-
period overlapping generations model with perfect foresight to study the 
interconnection between publicly and privately provided social security. Consumers 
live for three periods, but take part in economic activity only when they are middle-
aged and old. We follow the non-altruistic approach, and basically consider all the 
donation levels, which improve the consumer’s welfare. In this way we are also 
assuming, as Ehrlich and Lui (1991) for example, that there is a social compact 
between parents and children. Children are partly viewed as a vehicle for old age 
support. An important question is: to what extent will the publicly provided social 
security system replace children as such a mechanism?  
In the empirical part we try to test the basic implications of the theoretical 
model. In particular, we focus on the relationship between fertility and the pension 
system. We try to control the other determinants/background variables of fertility, 
such as the income level, infant mortality and the life expectancy. Obviously, the 
growth of the pension system is just a part of the growth of the welfare state. Thus, the 
results of the empirical analysis cannot really discriminate between the effects of the 
pension system in the strict sense or the welfare state in general. One additional 3   
complication is the fact that at least some indicators of the welfare state also include 
expenditures on various child support systems which obviously affect fertility in a 
quite different way.  Anyway, our evidence might help in designing policies, which 
will have less harmful effects on labour supply (retirement age) and fertility. If our 
thesis is correct, it would be dangerous for governments to try to solve the fiscal 
problems due to ageing with higher taxes and larger transfers, since fertility decline 
might still accelerate further, and make matters actually worse.  Using the German 
data Cigno, Casolaro and Rosati (2002/2003) have tested empirically the effect of 
social security system on fertility. There is a negative effect, but they also point out 
that this effect jeopardizes the system’s future by eroding the base of future 
contributions.  
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we describe the behaviour of economic 
agents and characterize those combinations of endowments and some key parameters 
for which it is advantageous for the middle-aged to have children. In section 3 we 
explore the effects of the public social security system on incentives to have children. 
In section4 we delve deeper into the determinants of fertility by studying empirically 
the effects of a set of variables on the long-term trend of fertility. Finally, some 
conclusions are provided in section 5.  
 
2. The Model and the Private Social Security 
We consider a perfect foresight overlapping generations exchange economy, where 
consumers live for three periods, but they are economically active only in the middle 
and the last period of their lives: there are young, middle-aged and old people. Due to 
endogenous fertility population growth rate is endogenous. Consumers born in period 
1 − t  are able to reproduce at t.
2 They choose the number of children (
y
t N ). We note 




t t N N n = . We assume that the mortality rate of the young agents is 
y
t m . We also 
use the notation for the survival rate for youngsters: 
y
t t m − =1 π . All the middle-aged 
will survive till the old age. 
  We compute the gross rate of population growth ( 1 / − t t N N ) as follows. The 
total number of people at t is 
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Rearranging we get 
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In the steady state (or in the balanced growth path)  π n N N t t = −1 /  
 Consumers have positive endowments in both periods denoted by  1 y  and  2 y . 
The lifetime utility function is ) ( ) ( 2 1
t t c u c u β + , where
t c1 refers to consumption in the 
middle age, and 
t c2  to consumption in the old age.  ) (c u  is assumed to be a strictly 
concave increasing function, and fulfills the following Inada conditions:  ∞ =
→ ) ( ' lim
0 c u
c  
and  0 ) ( ' lim =
∞ → c u
c . 
1 ) 1 (
− + = ρ β , where ρ  is the rate of time preference. 
  Without any social security arrangement (private and/or public) the consumers 
get the level of utility U  ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 y u y u β + = ). We first consider the private social 
security system, where the source for income in the old age is the children. The 
middle-aged pay the amount  t α  for their parents, and when old, the current middle-
aged get the amount  1 + t t tnα π  from their children.  
The cost of rearing and educating one child is ν . In addition, there is a 
possibility to invest (denoted by  t s ) in a private asset. This market is not, however, 
operative in equilibrium.  
  The decision problem of the middle-aged person is 
(P1) 
{} t t
t t s n c c , , , 2 1
max ) ( ) ( 2 1
t t c u c u β +  
 s.t. 
 (i)  t t t
t s vn y c − − − = α 1 1  5   
 (ii)  t t t t t
t s R n y c 1 1 2 2 + + + + = α π . 
In this general form the decision problem is quite interesting, since unlike e.g. Boldrin 
and Jones (2002), Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005) and in fact also Ehrlich and Lui 
(1991) we do not assume that the utility of the middle-aged person depends on that of 
their parents. If that were the case, it would be quite straightforward to derive the 
optimal amount of the gift ( t α ) that the middle-aged person wishes to donate to his 
parents. 
  We are not going to solve the general problem (P1), but leave that for future 
work. We just briefly conjecture, how that solution might look like. We follow the 
ideas from Azariadis and Galasso (2002) (see also Cigno 1993), where they 
characterize the social security system under majority voting. Abstracting from saving 
in (P1) it is easy to see that the sequence of donations,  {}
∞
=1 t t α , must fulfill the 
condition 
(4)  U n y u vn y u t t t t t ≥ + + − − + ) ( ) ( 1 2 1 α π β α , 
to be individually rational. The current middle-aged consumer decides  t α  and t n , and 
their children make a decision on 1 + t α . We conjecture that a positive sequence will be 
supported by some form of trigger strategies, and most importantly as in Azariadis 
and Galasso (2002), we conjecture that there are a multitude of such sequences.  
In what follows we assume as in Ehrlich and Lui (1991) that there is a social 
compact (or a family insurance arrangement) between the parents and their children. 
Indeed we assume that the level of donation is some constant, and characterize the 
optimal amount of children taking the level of donation as a parameter. Indeed, we 
only consider the stationary equilibria. Furthermore, we assume that the periodic 
utility function is logarithmic. Since children are a vehicle for saving, it will become 
clear below that given the arbitrary level of endowments it is not always optimal to 
have a positive level of children. Below we need to make assumptions which 
guarantee that our economy is Samuelsonian using the rather famous terminology 
propose by Gale (1973). 
  The decision problem now becomes 
(P2) 
{} t t
t t s n c c , , , 2 1
max 2 1 ln ln c c β +  
 s.t. 6   
 (i)  s vn y c − − − = α 1 1  
 (ii)  Rs n y c + + = πα 2 2 . 
















An obvious arbitrage condition is  R v = / πα  so that investment in children provides 
the same return as in an asset. We describe the decision situation in Figure 1. It makes 
clear the fact that it is not always advantageous to invest in children, since 
endowments provide the utility levelU . Consider e.g. high values for the cost of 
rearing children (v) and the low value for the survival probability (π ) and the level of 
donation (α ). Of course, the final allocation with e.g. positive investment in children 













  Next we just characterize the optimal determination of the number of children, 
and forget the saving decision, since in equilibrium there will be no saving. We get 
(6) 
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which looks a lot like the regular saving function with the logarithmic preferences. 











, 7   
which is very close to the condition for the Samuelson case in models without 
endogenous population growth.  
  Next we return to the general case for a moment. We can express the utility as 
a function of the number of children and the level of donation as 
(8)     ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 πα β α α n y u vn y u n V + + − − = . 
The optimal choices of the number of children and the level of donation should 
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Given the logarithmic utility we get two weak inequalities that the parameters must 
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) ( 1 2 y h  is a linear function of the first period endowment. We easily see that  0 ) 0 ( 1 = h  
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One can see that there is one minimum for the function with a positive value for  1 y , 






∞ → ) ( ' lim 1 1
1
, which 
equals the slope of the line  ) ( 1 2 y h . This means that the inequality (11ii) is the only 
relevant inequality. In Figure 2 we have drawn the areas of endowments, which fulfill 
both inequalities (11). We also see that the relevant area shrinks down, whenever the 
survival probability or the level of donation gets smaller. The same happens, if the 8   
cost of having children increases. An important point of this exercise is that there are 
combinations of endowments and parameters such that it is advantageous for the 
middle-aged to have children and donate some of their resources to their parents. E.g. 
if the economy is such that  0 2 = y , it is in the interest of the middle-aged have 
children and make donations for every   1 y < α . In what follows we assume that we 
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3. The Effects on Fertility of the Publicly Provided Social Security 
From now on we assume that there is a pay-as-you-go social security system such that 
the benefit received in old age is financed by the lump-sum tax levied in the middle 
age. The system is thus balanced, and there is no need for government to float debt.  t τ  
is the tax on young, and  t b  the benefit received by the old in that period. The budget 
















t N m n N 1 1 1 ) 1 ( − − − − = , it follows that per old benefit can be 
expressed as 
(14)  t t t t
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In the steady state we have that πτ n b = . 9   
  With logarithmic utility function we have the following decision problem 
(P3) 
{} t t
t t s n c c , , , 2 1
max 2 1 ln ln c c β +  
 s.t. 
 (i)  s vn y c − − − − = τ α 1 1  
 (ii)  Rs b n y c + + + = πα 2 2 . 
The budget constraints imply the following lifetime constraint 
(15) 
R













It is important to note that we are assuming that the agents consider the future benefit 
parametrically, and do not see their own actions (voting in particular) as affecting the 
outcome of the political equilibrium. Indeed, we do not consider the determination of 
taxes and benefits in a political equilibrium.
3 Although when we analyze the 
equilibrium reactions of the agents, we need to take account the public sector’s budget 
constraint. 
  The optimal number of children is now 
(16) 
) 1 ( ) 1 (













Totally differentiating (16) and government’s budget constraint we get 
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from where we get that  0 / < τ d dn . 
 
4. The Empirical Effects of Some Key Variables on Fertility 
After these theoretical considerations we turn to empirical testing. The main purpose 
of this analysis is to see whether the data do indeed support the notion that the growth 
of social security depresses fertility. For that purpose we estimate simple linear 
models in which social security is proxied with some alternative ways (using 
                                                 
3 For such a model, but with a different emphasis from ours, see Azariadis and Galasso (2002). 10   
indicators for the government size as main proxies) and in which the role of this 
variable is controlled by the most obvious determinants of fertility (income, 
education, infant mortality, structure of the economy and life expectancy).
4  
  There might be some ambiguity with the variables determining fertility. 
Theory does not clearly predict how they affect fertility. Intuitively, we might expect 
that the longer life-expectancy makes children’s support more valuable, and thus 
investment in children would give higher return. Therefore, ceteris paribus, there 
ought to be a positive relationship between life-expectancy and fertility. In the raw 
data, the relationship is just the opposite, but the reason is obvious. Life expectancy is 
highly correlated with income and all other indicators of economic development 
which in turn affect fertility. What we really need is the conditional effect of life-
expectancy on fertility. That may be only obtained by a proper multivariate model.  
  In the empirical analyses, three data sets have been used: First of all we use 
historical data from 11 countries for the period 1860-2000. These data provide a lot 
variation in terms of all basic determinants of fertility (social security, education, life 
expectancy, infant mortality and income). In this respect the data are “better” than the 
more recent data where – at least in the developed countries – relatively little time-
variation can be found in these variables. Obviously, the quality of the old data may 
be poor and sample sizes small (the historical data represent five -in some cases ten-
year – intervals). The main data source is Mitchell (2005), although several national 
data sources are also utilized.
5  
  In addition to these historical data we also use the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) data that cover the period 1960-2002. An update covers a bit longer 
period 1960-2003, but some key variables are not any more included in the data bank. 
These data sets include practically all countries in the world and the number of data 
points is at least 2300.  Finally, we use the MZES (Manheimer Zentrum fur 
Europäische Sozialforschung) data on social security expenditures. The MZES data 
                                                 
4 We have also scrutinized the role of child support on fertility using the detailed MZES data. 
Preliminary results with a very crude indicator, child support expenditures/GDP, suggest that child 
support does indeed have a positive impact on fertility in the cross-section of 21 countries. Although 
the result is quite robust for the whole panel some important individual country exceptions are found.   
5 The long time series of the fertility rate data have been constructed by dividing the number of births 
with the female age cohorts of 15-49. With the WDI and MZES data, the usual fertility measure is 
used.  11   
cover the period 1949-1993 for 21 European countries.
6 Here we focus only pension 
expenditures, on the one hand, and total social security expenditures, on the other 
hand, both in relation to GDP. Both variables are related to fertility rates to facilitate 
comparison with relationships between fertility and cruder proxies of pensions and 
social security.  
  The results are reported below in the following fashion.  The fertility data are 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The relationship between fertility and its potential 
determinants are illustrated with subsequent scatter diagrams (Figures 3-5). The 
simple sample correlations between fertility other variables are reported in Table 1. 
Finally, estimation results with the alternative data sets are reported in Tables 2-5. All 
estimation results represent the panel data sets in which all coefficients are restricted 
to be equal.  
The results can be summarized in the following way. In the estimated models 
all variables follow the predictions of the theory. Thus, income and education have a 
negative and infant mortality a positive effect on fertility. The role of life expectancy 
(or the share of old all people) is somewhat ambiguous. By contrast, the role of the 
government size (or social security) looks quite systematically negative: the bigger is 
government the lower is the fertility rate.  
  Obviously, we have potentially a severe measurement problem with the 
government size and the social security variables. Bigger government might just 
reflect more bureaucracy or more government interventions in the economy. It might 
also simply reflect wars or other problems. Perhaps proper measures would be some 
types of forecasts of government total outlays to (net of taxes) old-age people. 
Needless to say, such data are not available.  
  There are perhaps even more difficult measurement issues with the 
government intervention variables. Both pension expenditure/GDP, social security 
expenditure/GDP and child support expenditure/GDP suffer from the basic weakness 
that they are not genuinely exogenous. For instance the pension expenditure/GDP 
ratio may increase both because of an increase in the level of pension benefits, and 
because of an increase in the number of pensioners.
7 The two things are, however, 
                                                 
6 The data base also include two countries (Slovakia and Czech republic) which are not include in our 
sample because they consist of  3 observations only (including those would not, however, make any 
difference).  
7 If the actual GDP is used as the scale variable some simultaneity problems might arise. Preferably, the 
trend of GDP ought to be used.  12   
quite different from the point of view of individual maximization behavior, the former 
is relevant the latter is not. To overcome this problem, better indicators are needed.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
Our paper has shown that fertility behavior can be considered analogously to 
investment in human capital and physical assets. Although the planning horizon of 
investors is quite long that does not make fertility behavior exogenous. Quite clearly it 
depends on the menu of investment alternatives and the respective returns. 
Government expenditures on social security constitute the key element, which affects 
the rate of return on investment in children. Not surprisingly, we present empirical 
evidence which is consistent with this conclusion.  This result has powerful policy 
implications. Attempts to improve old-age support may lead to depressing fertility, 
which cannot really be offset by any child support programs. These negative fertility 
effects might be accompanied by negative labor supply effects due to higher tax rates 
which are needed to finance both systems. In this light one ought to reconsider the 
limits of the welfare state in securing all income risks.  13   
 
Table 1   Correlations with the fertility variable  
 
Variable   Historical 
data 
WDI data  WDI update 
Infant mortality   .816  .851  .831 
Participation to education   -.659     
Literacy rate    -.817  -.817 
University enrollment rate    -.671   
School enrollment rate    -.759   
Share of old people  -.845     
Life expectancy    -.853  -.853 
Share of agriculture/GDP    .661   
Military expenditure/GDP    .281   
Government expenditures/GDP   -.635  -.271   
Gross tax rate    -.456   
Public consumption/GDP    -.167  -.153 
GDP per capita  -.286  -.226   
GDP growth   -.035*  .055  -.111 
Unemployment rate    -.018*   
All correlations are pair-wise and computed from the corresponding panel data sets. Starred values are 
NOT significant the 5 per cent level of significance.  
 14   
Table 2   Results with the historical data for 1860-2000.   
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war     -.005 
(0.88) 
     
n  181 181 181 194 194  181 168 
R2    0.825 0.792 0.844 0.834 0.788  0.873 0.842 
SEE  0.023 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014  0.13  0.012 












model  FE    RE FE FE RE  FE FE 
Corrected t-ratios are inside parentheses. All estimates are panel GLS estimates. In equation 7, Japan is 
excluded. FE indicates the fixed effects model and RE the random effects model. Tests refer to the 
corresponding fixed effects test (all cross-section effects are zero) and Hausman specification test for 
the orthogonality of cross-section error terms and the RHS variables.  GDP denotes per capita GDP in 
fixed US dollars and IMR infant mortality rate. Government size (gov.size) is measured by government 
expenditures/GDP and "education" by participation to primary education. "Old" denotes the share of 
old (> 65 years if age) people out of total population and "War" is a dummy for war years.  
 
Table 2   continued: some stability analysis  
 
 6  6'  6" 






























n 181  104  148 
R2   0.873  0.712  0.8126 
SEE 0.013  0.015  0.014 






model FE  FE  FE 
Equation 6 represents the full sample for 1850-2000, equation 6' 1850-1965 and 6" 1850-1985.  15   
 
 
Table 3   Results with the WDI data for 1960-2002 
 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
















































I M R           . 0 1 2  
(7.41) 
m i l i t a r y           - . 1 5 2  
(9.19) 
R2  0.801  0.844 0.801 0.871 0.381 0.793 0.962 0.984 
SEE  1.290  1.455 1.290 0.692 0.703 0.917 0.392 0.642 







N  2523  1534 1528 2523 2533 685  685  135 
Estimator  GLS  GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS OLS GLS 
Panel    No  No No FE RE No FE No 
Gov.size GQ  TAX EXP GQ  GQ  TAX TAX TAX 
GQ denotes public consumption/GDP, EXP total government expenditure/GDP and TAX gross tax 
returns/GDP. Literacy denotes adult literacy rate, "Life expectancy" life expectancy at birth, IMR 
denotes the infant mortality rate and "Military" military expenditures/GDP. The number of countries is 






























































Corrected t-values are inside parentheses. Results with the full set variables make use of 230 data 




Table 5   Relationship between fertility and social security 
 








































Random effects  
6.40 
(0.011)  
Corrected t-values are inside parentheses. Panel tests denote F test statistics for the fixed and random 
effects specifications, respectively (see Table 2 for details). Marginal probabilities are inside 



















 17   







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fertility
Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h =  0.7212)
 
 
The distribution reflects differences in fertility rates both over countries and over time. Data source: the 
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Figure 3   Scatter diagram between fertility and its determinants from the 



























































































































































Numbers are median values of countries for 1860-2000. Note that in the last graph we compare 
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Figure 5   Scatter diagram between fertility and pension/social expenditure 


















































Data source: the MZES data bank. The observations are median values over 21 countries for the period 
1949-1992.   
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